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South Africa has rapidly reduced trade barriers since the end of Apartheid, yet agricultural 
production and exports have remained sluggish. Also, poverty and unemployment have risen 
and become increasingly concentrated in rural areas. This paper examines the extent to which 
remaining price distortions, both domestic and foreign, are contributing to the 
underperformance of the agricultural sector vis-à-vis the rest of the economy. We draw on a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) and micro-simulation model of South Africa that are 
linked to the results of a global trade model. This framework is used to examine the effects of 
eliminating global and domestic price distortions. Model results indicate that South Africa’s 
agricultural sector currently benefits from global price distortions, and that removing these 
would create more jobs for lower-skilled workers, thereby reducing income inequality and 
poverty. We also find that South Africa’s own policies are biased against agriculture and that 
removing domestic distortions would raise agricultural production. Job losses in 
nonagricultural sectors would be outweighed by job creation in agriculture, such that overall 
employment rises and poverty falls. Overall, our findings suggest that South Africa’s own 
policies are more damaging to its welfare, poverty and inequality than distortionary policies 
in the rest of the world. Existing national price distortions may thus explain some of the poor 
performance of South Africa’s agricultural sector and rural development. 
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Agricultural distortions, poverty and inequality 
in South Africa 
 




South Africa rapidly re-entered global markets after Apartheid ended in the early 1990s. The 
country had previously faced economic sanctions, which created severe foreign exchange 
shortages and forced the government to restrict imports and encourage exports through a 
complex system of tariffs and subsidies (Bell 1993). The result was a heavily distorted 
economy designed to maintain self-sufficiency and macroeconomic stability. Following the 
change in government, sanctions were lifted and South Africa became a member of the 
World Trade Organization. The new government placed trade liberalization at the center of 
its export-oriented growth strategy (Republic of South Africa 1996). Import tariffs were 
reduced, export subsidies were eliminated, and most quantitative restrictions were replaced 
by tariffs. However, despite these reforms, South Africa’s system of protection remains 
complex, with import tariffs still favoring a narrow range of sectors (Cassim, Onyango and 
van Seventer 2004). 
South Africa’s economic performance improved during the 1990s, with growth 
reaching five percent per year by 2005. Evidence suggests that removing trade distortions 
contributed positively to growth during this period (Jonsson and Subramanian 2001) without 
reducing aggregate employment (Edwards 2001). Studies also find that trade-induced growth 
did not contribute to the rise in poverty during the 1990s and may have even helped reduce 
poverty in more recent years (Hérault 2007, Thurlow 2007). However, past distortions were 
biased in favor of lower-skilled workers, especially those working in the protected textiles 
and clothing sectors (Edwards 2001). Their removal has thus exacerbated income inequality 
(Thurlow 2007).  
During the 1990s there also emerged a growing rural-urban divide. The share of South 
Africa’s poor population living in rural areas rose from 60 to 70 percent during 1995-2000 2 
 
 
                                                
(Hoogeveen and Özler 2005).
1 Agriculture is an important sector for rural livelihoods, 
employing one in four rural workers (more if upstream activities are included). However, 
agriculture grew only half as fast as non-agriculture during 1990-2005 (World Bank 2008), 
because gains from export growth were more than offset by rising import penetration (Jooste, 
Van Schalkwyk and Groenewald 2003). This poor performance is undoubtedly responsible 
for some of the rise in rural poverty. However, it is unclear why agricultural growth was 
slow, and to what extent global and/or domestic price and trade policies were biased against 
agriculture and rural development. One study suggests that domestic policies may have hurt 
agriculture during the late 1990s when the effective rate of protection was negative, implying 
that tariffs on inputs more than offset output protection (van Seventer 2001). There is also 
evidence that global distortions were biased against agriculture (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 
1992).  However, a more recent study indicates that agricultural support was above that of 
other tradable goods sectors during 1961-2006 (Kirsten, Edwards and Vink 2009). 
In this chapter we examine the impact on the South African economy of removing 
distortions on global and domestic prices. More specifically, we estimate the size of the 
remaining bias against agriculture and identify the transmission channels through which trade 
distortions influence poverty and income inequality. This is done using a top-down 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) and microsimulation model. The next section 
describes South Africa’s economic structure and its current system of distortions. The 
following two sections outline the methodology and present the results from the model 
simulations. The final section offers some concluding comments. 
 
 
Economic structure and trade distortions in South Africa 
 
 
Table 1 describes the South African economy in 2002, when agriculture was already a small 
sector generating four percent of gross domestic product (GDP). It does, however, have 
strong linkages to upstream processing, which generate a further five percent of GDP. 
Agriculture and processing together contribute 8.5 percent to total export earnings and are 
 
1 Measured using the national 2000 Income and Expenditure survey and a US$2-a-day poverty line (Hoegoven 




among the country’s more heavily traded commodities, with 17 percent of agricultural output 
being exported. Summer cereals (maize), fruits, cotton, tobacco and livestock are the main 
export sectors, accounting for more than 90 percent of total agricultural exports. Agricultural 
growth during the 1990s was driven by the strong export performance of maize, fruits and 
livestock, although this was offset by rising import demand for these commodities, caused by 
larger declines in agricultural tariffs. Although import penetration remains low, it doubled 
during the 1990s as South Africa opened to global markets (Jooste, Van Schalkwyk and 
Groenewald 2003). Import penetration is particularly high for winter cereals (wheat), cotton 
and tobacco. International trade is therefore becoming increasingly important for agriculture, 
and the sector is responsive to changing trade distortions. 
Despite agriculture’s small and declining share of the economy, it remains an 
important source of employment. In 2003 more than a million people worked in agriculture 
out of a total employment of 11.5 million (Casale, Muller and Posel 2004). Around 70 
percent of agricultural workers are employed as laborers on large commercial farms, where 
they earn one-third of the national average wage. These 60,000 commercial farms occupy 87 
percent of total agricultural land and produce 95 percent of all marketed output (Vink and 
Kirsten 2003). By contrast, the remaining 300,000 agricultural workers are smallholder 
farmers, who occupy 13 percent of agricultural land in the more remote regions of the 
country. These subsistence-oriented farmers earn less than five percent of the national 
average wage (Casale, Muller and Posel 2004). Thus, not only is there a growing rural-urban 
divide, but there is also a divide within agriculture. Smallholders derive much of their income 
in the form of subsistence production and thus are less likely to be affected by changes in 
price and trade distortions. By contrast, factors affecting commercial farming may have large 
impacts on both national employment and rural incomes. 
Mining has historically been the cornerstone of the South African economy, primarily 
as a source of export earnings. However, the mining sector also has strong upstream linkages 
to metals processing, and together these sectors represent about ten percent of total GDP. 
However, these sectors are more capital-intensive and generate a smaller share of total 
employment. By contrast, construction, textiles and clothing are amongst South Africa’s 
more labor-intensive sectors. Finally, food processing is another important manufacturing 




grain milling and sugar refining are key processing subsectors. Non-food processing is 
dominated by the capital-intensive metals and chemicals sectors. 
Most export taxes and subsidies were eliminated during the 1990s. The government 
stopped intervening in input and product markets, allowing farmers to respond more 
effectively to both climate variability and changing market opportunities (van Schalkwyk et 
al., 2003). Thus, the largest remaining price distortions are import tariffs. Average tariffs in 
South Africa are, however, relatively low at 5.3 percent. Tariffs on agricultural commodities 
are especially low, at between two and three percent, with the exception of a 14.6 percent 
wheat tariff. Upstream food processing enjoys far greater protection, with average tariffs of 
16.8 percent. Especially high tariffs are applied to dairy products and refined sugar. Of the 
remaining manufacturing sectors, considerable protection is afforded to textiles, clothing and 
motor vehicles. These are considered ‘sensitive sectors’ and have received special 
dispensation under South Africa’s various trade agreements. Thus, despite far-reaching 
reforms during the 1990s, import tariffs are not uniformly applied across sectors, and further 
rationalization is often subjected to pressure from trade unions, especially in the metals, 
textiles and clothing sectors. Indeed, tariff revenues account for less than six percent of total 
government income, and tariffs on agriculture and processed food generate less than 15 
percent of these earnings. Removing trade distortions will therefore have direct implications 






In our analysis we draw on the ‘rest-of–world’ (i.e., global minus South Africa) results for the 
global trade liberalization scenario from the World Bank’s Linkage model (see van der 
Mensbrugghe 2005). This model provides estimated changes in world import prices, world 
export prices, and export quantities facing South Africa (see van der Mensbrugghe, 
Valenzuela and Anderson 2009). These world price and export quantity changes are imposed 
exogenously on the South African CGE model, where the additional impacts of domestic 
trade reforms are also modeled. The CGE estimates the impact of global and domestic 




                                                
then passed down to a microsimulation model, which estimates poverty and inequality 
effects. This section describes the South African CGE and microsimulation models. 
 
Computable general equilibrium model 
 
The national CGE model contains 110 activities/commodities, including 17 agricultural and 
12 food processing sectors.
2 The model identifies four factors of production: three types of 
labor (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled) and the factor capital.
3 Agricultural land is not 
distinguished from other forms of capital.
4 Skilled labor and capital are assumed to be fully 
employed with flexible wages and returns. To reflect South Africa’s high levels of 
unemployment, we assume that the supply of semi-skilled and unskilled labor is perfectly 
elastic at a fixed nominal wage.
5 Labor returns in the model are calibrated to capture sector 
wage differentials, such that agricultural wages are lower than those in most non-agricultural 
sectors. In addition, labour is fully mobile across sectors. Producers in the model maximize 
profits under constant returns to scale, with the choice between factors governed by a non-
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Factors are combined with fixed-
share intermediates under a Leontief specification. 
Substitution possibilities exist between production for domestic and foreign markets 
based on a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. Profit maximization drives 
producers to sell in those markets where they can achieve the highest returns. These returns 
are based on domestic and export prices (where the latter are determined by their world price 
times the exchange rate adjusted for any border taxes or subsidies). Similar substitution 
possibilities also exist between imported and domestic goods under a CES Armington 
specification. The final ratio of imports to domestic goods is determined by the cost-
minimizing decision making of domestic demanders based on the relative prices of imports 
 
2 The International Food Policy Research Institute’s static model is used for this study (Lofgren, Harris and 
Robinson 2002). 
3 Appendix Table A5 shows the factor intensities of various aggregate sectors, as well as the factor substitution 
elasticities used in the sectoral production functions. 
4 Agricultural land is not separated because arable land is underutilized and land rents are low at five percent of 
land values (Ortmann and Machethe 2003). Thus, we assume that agricultural production is less constrained by 
the availability of land, but rather by the availability of other forms of capital (e.g., machinery, irrigation and 
other infrastructure). Furthermore, commercial land rents, like other forms of capital, mainly accrue to high-
income households, leaving the poverty effects of agricultural distortions unaffected by this assumption.    
5 South Africa’s unemployment rate was 32 percent in 2003 under a strict definition and 43 percent if the non-
searching unemployed are included in the workforce (Casale, Muller and Posel 2004). While nominal wages are 




and domestic goods (both of which include relevant taxes). Under the small-country 
assumption, South Africa faces perfectly elastic world demand and supply at fixed world 
prices. However, this small country assumption is dropped when modeling the impacts of 
global liberalization. In other words, world import prices are exogenous in the South African 
CGE model, while world export prices and quantities are determined using the approach 
outlined in Horridge (2004).  
The model distinguishes between various institutions, including enterprises, the 
government, and a single representative household group. Households and enterprises receive 
income in payment for producers’ use of their factors of production. Both institutions pay 
direct taxes to government (based on fixed tax rates), save (based on marginal propensities to 
save), and make transfers to the rest of the world. Enterprises pay their remaining income to 
households in the form of dividends. Households, unlike enterprises, use their income to 
consume commodities under a linear expenditure system (LES) of demand. The government 
receives income from imposing activity, sales and direct taxes and import tariffs, and then 
makes transfers to households, enterprises and the rest of the world. The government also 
purchases commodities in the form of government consumption expenditure, and the 
remaining income of government is (dis)saved. All savings from households, enterprises, 
government and the rest of the world (foreign savings) are collected in a savings pool from 
which investment is financed. 
In order to balance the model’s macroeconomic accounts, it is necessary to specify a 
set of ‘closure’ rules. A savings-driven closure is assumed in order to balance the savings-
investment account. Under this closure, the marginal propensities to save of households and 
enterprises are fixed, while investment adjusts to changes in incomes to ensure that the level 
of investment and savings are equal. For the current account we assume that a flexible 
exchange rate adjusts in order to maintain a fixed level of foreign savings. Finally, for the 
government account, the fiscal deficit is fixed in absolute terms, with government revenues 
and expenditures balanced through uniform changes in direct tax rates on households and 
enterprises. Table 2 shows current direct tax rates for poor/non-poor and rural/urban 
households as observed in the microsimulation model. Tax rates are highest for urban 
households in the top income decile. Changes in tax rates based on the existing tax structure 
mainly affect higher-income households while poor households are largely unaffected since 




                                                
changes in income tax rates will influence income inequality, leaving the poverty effects of 
trade reforms largely unchanged.   
The CGE model is calibrated to a 2002 social accounting matrix (SAM). Information 
on non-agricultural production was taken from the 2002 Supply-Use Tables (StatsSA 2004) 
and national accounts (SARB 2008). Agricultural production was disaggregated across crops 
and subsectors using the 2002 Census of Commercial Agriculture (StatsSA 2002).  
Information on labor employment and wages was drawn from the 2000 Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) (StatsSA 2001) and the 2004 (September) Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) (StatsSA 2005).  Trade elasticities are taken from the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(Dimaranan 2006) and household income elasticities are those estimated in Case (2000). 
Initial price distortions, such as import tariff rates, are consistent with the global Linkage 




Predicted impacts from the national CGE model are passed down to a microsimulation model 
for South Africa. Under a top-down specification, changes in commodity prices, household 
tax rates, factor returns, and employment levels from the CGE model are imposed on the MS 
model, which then estimates behavioral responses at the household level for each of the 
26,000 households in the 2000 IES and LFS.
6 There are two parts to the MS model. First, a 
selection model predicts the employment status of working-age individuals (that is, inactive, 
unemployed, subsistence agricultural worker, informal worker or formal worker). The 
probability of an individual having a particular status is derived from a linear utility function 
based on individuals’ characteristics. Second, a regression model predicts formal and 
informal earnings. The regression and selection models are econometrically estimated for 
four demographic groups: single women, partnered women, single men and partnered men. 
The structure of household income for poor, non-poor and rich households in urban 
and rural areas are shown in table 3. Since occupational choices are endogenous, these 
income shares are not assumed to be fixed (and can thus be affected by trade reforms). 
Individuals’ labor earnings are added to other income sources and adjusted to reflect new tax 
rates in order to update households’ disposable incomes in the survey. This is then deflated 
 




by a household-specific consumer price index based on the household-specific budget shares, 
shown in table 4, and on changes in commodity prices from the CGE model. This re-
estimated level of household expenditure is then compared to various poverty lines to 
determine changes in poverty.  
The top-down approach used to link the MS model to the CGE model is described in 
detail in Hérault (2006). The approach ensures that changes in prices, direct tax rates, 
earnings from wages and salaries, returns from capital, as well as employment levels are 
transmitted from the CGE to the MS model. Thus, the MS model predicts how individuals’ 
behavior and household incomes are affected by the economy wide impacts predicted by the 






We ran four simulations to examine the effects of price distortions on agriculture, poverty 
and inequality. We begin by considering the effects of distortions in the rest of the world on 
the South African economy. The first simulation assesses the impact of removing all 
merchandise trade policy measures and domestic agricultural policies in other countries of the 
world, without any change to South Africa’s own distortions. The second simulation 
considers only the removal of agricultural sector distortions in the rest of the world. The 
effects at South Africa’s borders of those liberalizations are drawn from the World Bank’s 
Linkage model. These include changes in the country’s import and export prices, as well as 
changes in the demand for South African exports (table 5). The remaining two simulations 
examine the effect on South Africa of removing only its own price distortions, first for all 
tradable goods sectors and then only within agriculture. In both of these latter simulations 
there are no changes in the rest of the world.  
 
Liberalization of all commodities by the rest of the world (ROW) 
 
Full liberalization by the rest of the world results in a positive terms-of-trade shock for South 




quantity of agricultural and food products demanded by the rest of the world expands for 
most items but contracts for horticultural goods which are the main source of agricultural 
exports (table 1). Demand also expands for other primary products, which is a key export 
sector since mining accounts for one-third of all export earnings. Demand contracts, however, 
for non-food manufactures (column 3 of table 3). On the import side, prices fall for non-food 
manufactures and for most farm products (column 1 of table 5). Overall, South Africa’s 
terms-of-trade improves by 1.4 percent, which causes exports to rise faster than imports. This 
reduces the trade deficit and places pressure on the current account balance, which, by 
assumption, is fixed in foreign currency. This induces an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate by 0.8 percent, which further stimulates import demand while partially offsetting export 
competitiveness. The net effect is that the volume of exports rises by only 0.2 percent while 
that of imports rises by 2.3 percent. For primary agricultural goods alone, exports fall 13 
percent and imports rise 5 percent (table 6).   
The decline in agricultural export demand causes agricultural GDP to fall by 0.2 
percent, mainly due to falling fruit production (table 7). Production of oilseeds also contracts, 
but they are a small share of the agricultural sector. Manufacturing GDP in total changes only 
slightly since increased production of processed foods is offset by falling production of other 
manufactured goods, such as textiles, clothing and machinery, which face rising import 
competition. Dairy and processed sugar production both expand substantially, contributing to 
food processing expansion and generating positive linkages to the dairy and raw sugar 
agricultural subsectors. It is, however, the large service sector that expands the most in 
absolute terms, causing national GDP to increase under full liberalization by the rest of the 
world. This is because declining production in the agricultural and non-food-processing 
manufacturing sectors reduces employment for capital and labor, causing them to migrate to 
the service sector (and to construction).  
The reduction in output of farm and textile products reduces the demand for lower-
skilled workers, while the expansion in other parts of the manufacturing sector and in 
services raises the demand for capital and skilled workers (table 8). Real wages for lower-
skilled workers thus decline and skilled workers’ wages and capital returns increase (table 9). 
However, with the nominal wage for unskilled and semi-skilled workers fixed by assumption, 
aggregate employment of both of those types of labor expands, by about one percent. This 




their average real wages, leading to larger net increases in their factor incomes compared to 
either capital or skilled workers. The net result is that national economic welfare, as measured 
by the equivalent variation in income, rises by 1.0 percent (final row in table 9). 
Falling prices for machinery and construction reduce the cost of investment, which 
rises as a result. Investment demand is further stimulated by an increase in private savings 
resulting from higher factor incomes (mainly capital returns). Falling import prices causes 
consumer prices to fall and real consumer spending to rise. Overall, the increase in real 
exports, consumption and investment spending, and the increase in employment for lower-
skilled labor, causes a slight increase (0.3 percent) in national GDP, despite the large increase 
in imports (table 6). 
The liberalization of all commodities by the rest of the world causes poverty to fall 
under all of the reported poverty lines (table 10). This is mainly due to the expansion of 
formal employment. As mentioned above, this expansion is biased towards lower-skilled 
workers. This is particularly beneficial to poor households because they derive almost all 
their market income from low-skilled labor (table 3). In addition, poorer households benefit 
more from lower consumer prices, especially for meat, sugar and ‘other foods’, which form a 
large share of their expenditures. Food and agricultural products represent more than half of 
poor households’ expenditures, whereas services and non-food processing manufacturing 
products make up more than half of rich households’ expenditures (table 4). The reduction in 
poverty tends to be lower in rural areas than in urban areas at the higher poverty lines. This is 
because rural households are more deeply rooted in poverty and because wages are 
significantly lower for rural workers, so that new jobs generate less income in rural than in 
urban areas. 
The rise in average informal earnings is caused by the trickle-down effect of formal 
sector development on informal earnings. The migration of informal workers into lower-
skilled formal jobs also raises the average skill level (and earnings) of the remaining informal 
workers. Conversely, the rise in lower paying lower-skilled formal employment places 
downward pressure on average formal earnings. Overall, however, the effects on inequality 
are negligible. The small reduction in income taxes and the higher returns to capital and 
skilled labor both contribute to a worsening of income inequality. However, offsetting this 




effect therefore leaves national inequality virtually unchanged, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient (final row in table 10). 
In summary, full global liberalization produces slight gains in GDP for South Africa, 
but hurts the primary agricultural sector. Yet food processing expands, which offsets some of 
the decline in competitiveness of the horticultural sector. Import competition encourages 
farmers to shift towards more labor-intensive production. The decrease in real wages for 
semi-skilled and unskilled labor leads to a significant increase in employment for lower-
skilled workers. This is the main force driving poverty reduction under this scenario. 
 
Liberalization of only agricultural commodities in ROW 
 
Even when reform abroad is restricted to just agricultural liberalization, a positive terms-of-
trade effect still results for South Africa. Its export prices rise by somewhat less than in the 
previous scenario (table 6). This is because export prices for most product groups except 
textiles and clothing rise rise by less than when all goods are liberalized (table 5). This is 
especially important for fruits, which are South Africa’s main agricultural export. However, 
in contrast to the previous simulation, there is now a small overall increase in import prices 
(table 6). This is because industrial and service sector prices rise instead of fall, which is 
important since heavy manufactures, such as machinery and vehicles, make up almost two-
thirds of total imports. The net result in this agriculture-only reform scenario is a 0.7 percent 
improvement in South Africa’s terms-of-trade which is half of the 1.4 percent improvement 
when all merchandise trade is liberalized by the rest of the world. The real exchange rate 
appreciation also is slightly smaller, and the impact on real GDP at market prices is only 0.08 
percent instead of 0.28 percent (table 6).  
The impacts on sectoral output differ from the previous scenario too (table 7). 
Agricultural GDP decreases by less, even though vegetables and fruit production falls slightly 
more and wheat now declines. Livestock production also increases more than in the previous 
simulation. Industrial GDP now falls slightly, despite rising output in the food processing 
subsector. The drop in manufacturing production adds to the small fall in agricultural GDP, 
which again causes a migration of workers to the service sector. However, the impact is less 
pronounced than in the previous scenario, given the smaller size of the terms-of-trade shock. 




national GDP and the shift to more capital-intensive sectors outside of food processing. 
Finally, while import prices rise in this simulation, the real appreciation is sufficient to offset 
this and the consumer price index still falls, albeit by less than under full merchandise trade 
reform. Falling prices cause an increase in household real incomes and aggregate consumer 
spending (table 6). 
Household incomes also benefit from increased employment for lower-skilled 
workers and higher returns for skilled labor and capital. The changes from this more-limited 
reform are about two-thirds the size of those from full merchandise trade liberalization, and 
the increase in national economic welfare is about three-fifths as large (table 9). This is a 
significant result, given the relatively small size of the agricultural sector, both globally and 
in South Africa. The result reflects the large distortions in agricultural markets in the rest of 
the world.   
The impacts on income inequality and household poverty are similar to the previous 
simulation and similarly small in magnitude, especially in rural areas (table 10). The fall in 
consumer prices plays a more important role in poverty alleviation than in the previous 
simulation, with poor households in particular benefiting from falling food prices. 
In summary, removing the rest of the world’s agricultural distortions would have a 
positive impact on South African GDP, national welfare, inequality and poverty. This impact 
is roughly two-thirds as large as those achieved under full merchandise trade reform, despite 
the fact that agriculture accounts for less than one-twelfth of both global and South African 
GDP and trade. 
 
Unilateral liberalization of all commodity markets 
 
Agricultural import tariffs are generally quite low in South Africa, with duty collection rates 
averaging five percent (table 1). Moreover, there are high tariffs on a relatively small range of 
manufactured goods, including a 15 percent tariff on wheat imports that dominates price 
distortions in South Africa. Import tariffs are particularly high on certain processed foods 
(dairy and processed sugar), textiles and clothing, and motor vehicles and related parts (e.g., 
tires and engines). By contrast, export taxes are low and uniform across commodities, with 




equally negligible, so it is the reduction in import tariffs that drives the results in the two 
unilateral liberalization simulations considered in this and the next sub-section.  
Eliminating all of South Africa’s border measures and domestic agricultural subsidies 
causes a large increase in import demand (table 6). This widens the trade deficit and induces 
a 1.9 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate, which offsets some of the rise in real 
imports. Export competitiveness is enhanced by the depreciation, thus encouraging producers 
to increase production for foreign markets. Total exports rise by 7.5 percent, while farm and 
manufactured exports rise by more than 10.0 percent.  
The exchange rate depreciation is sufficient to offset the decline in tariffs for some 
import-competing industries, causing their GDP to expand (table 7). By contrast, for heavily 
protected commodities such as wheat, dairy, textiles and clothing imports increase and GDP 
falls. Thus, in line with the initial distribution of tariffs, agricultural imports increase by less 
than manufactured imports. Export expansion is more evenly distributed across both 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Within agriculture, it is cotton, tobacco and fruits 
that drive the increase in exports. 
Unilateral liberalization has a larger positive impact on real consumer spending than 
liberalization by the rest of the world. This is because falling import prices reduce the 
consumer price index, thereby raising real household incomes. Rising incomes also increases 
the level of savings and investment in the economy. Investment is further supported by the 
expansion of the metals and machinery sectors and the reduction in import prices for capital 
goods, both of which contribute to a reduction in the cost of investment. Ultimately, rising 
consumption, exports and investment lead to larger increases in total GDP from unilateral 
reform, of 1.0 percent compared to less than 0.3 percent from rest-of-world reform (table 6).  
Increased production also creates additional jobs for lower-skilled workers, and again 
more so than under only rest-of-world reform (table 9). Although most of these are lower-
paying agricultural jobs, there is also an increase in higher-paying jobs in the manufacturing 
sector. New jobs are created in the metals and machinery sectors, both of which pay higher 
wages than the textiles and clothing sectors, where jobs are lost. Unskilled workers also 
migrate to service sector jobs, not all of which are in the lower-paying trade sector. Overall, 
there is a net migration into higher-paying sectors, causing average real wages and total 
employment to rise for unskilled workers. There is also increased demand for skilled 




skilled workers are already employed in the service sector, where wages are typically highest. 
So it is the overall increase in demand rather than intersectoral shifts that drives the increase 
in wages for these workers. Finally, semi-skilled workers are more intensively employed in 
the textile subsectors and so these workers face the largest declines in employment once 
protection for these sectors is removed. 
Larger increases in factor incomes cause aggregate household welfare to improve by 
more in this simulation than in the previous two scenarios. Poverty reduction is also larger 
(table 10). The increase in unskilled and semi-skilled real wages, combined with the 
expansion of employment for these workers, is the main force driving poverty alleviation. 
Indeed, low-income households are the most dependent on low-skilled labor. The slight 
decline in national inequality is due to the combination of these labor market changes and the 
substantial increase in income taxes needed to replace lost tariff revenues. In this scenario, 
aggregate household income taxes rise by more than ten percent (not percentage points). 
In summary, unilaterally removing price distortions in South Africa would cause 
national GDP to expand and would boost agricultural GDP more than twice as much as 
industry or services. This suggests that current domestic distortions are biased against the 
agricultural sector. However, much of the benefits to agriculture accrue to specific export-
oriented crops, such as cotton, tobacco and fruits, while other farm subsectors would be 
adversely affected. Manufacturing employment would also decline, especially in the 
‘sensitive’ textiles and clothing sectors. This is, however, more than offset by new jobs in the 
heavier industrial and service sectors. Thus, aggregate household welfare improves, national 
poverty declines, and, there is a small decline in inequality. 
 
Unilateral liberalization of only agricultural commodities 
 
Removing price distortions only in South Africa’s agricultural and processed food sector 
produces macroeconomic results similar to but much smaller than those in the previous 
simulation. Raising import demand and export supply induces a small depreciation of the real 
exchange rate, which enhances the competitiveness in foreign markets of domestic producers 
of exports. Falling import prices also lower consumer prices, benefiting private consumption 
and increasing national GDP but only one-ninth as much as in the previous scenario (table 6). 




is much smaller. This is not surprising since South Africa’s agricultural and food processing 
sectors are only a small part of national GDP and are not as protected as the manufacturing 
sector.  
Under the unilateral liberalization of all goods, agriculture benefited from the large 
depreciation of the exchange rate driven by declining nonagricultural tariffs and rising import 
penetration for nonagricultural commodities. However, in the current agriculture-only 
scenario, the depreciation is smaller and is driven entirely by falling agricultural supports and 
food processing tariffs. Thus, only agriculture faces an increase in import competition and it 
is the nonagricultural sectors that benefit from the resulting depreciation. Accordingly, there 
is a decline in agricultural GDP in this scenario. This is driven by declining wheat 
production, which has high initial tariffs. Fruit, cotton and tobacco, which had increased 
production substantially under the previous scenario, now expand more modestly because of 
the smaller depreciation, while livestock declines as producers shift production towards more 
export-oriented activities and because of increased imports of processed meats. Food 
processing suffers the largest drop in production under agriculture-only liberalization. For 
instance, the dried fruit and tobacco sectors now contract, contributing further to agriculture’s 
decline. The industrial and service sectors expand production, mainly due to increased export 
demand following the depreciation. The largest increases are in the metals, machinery and 
motor vehicles sectors. The slowdown in investment, however, causes a slight decline in 
construction, and the modest expansion of services is driven by trade, which benefits from 
South Africa’s increased openness. Overall, there is a much smaller increase in national GDP 
under this scenario because of the smaller size of the shock and the decline in investment 
demand (table 7). 
Increased import competition for agricultural commodities and only modest additional 
demand from nonagricultural expansion causes agricultural prices to fall by more than 
nonagricultural prices. This increases relative returns in non-agriculture, causing workers to 
migrate out of agriculture. The real returns to lower-skilled agricultural labor increase slightly 
causing the decline in unskilled employment due to the contraction of agricultural production. 
Increased nonagricultural production creates additional jobs for semi-skilled workers, but 
these jobs pay similar wages to agriculture, leaving average wages largely unchanged and 




This scenario thus has the smallest impacts on poverty and inequality, even though 
they are in the same direction as in the previous simulation (except for unskilled labor’s real 
wage, which declines very slightly). Unlike in previous scenarios, poverty alleviation under 
unilateral agricultural liberalization is driven mainly by consumer price changes. Although 
the reduction in the consumer price index is smaller than in the previous scenario, the 
changes are more beneficial for the poor as there are substantial declines in prices of food 
items that are a large share of poor households’ expenditures. Hence poverty is alleviated and 
income inequality declines slightly even in this scenario (table 10). 
In summary, while unilaterally removing agricultural and food processing distortions 
has a negative impact on these sectors’ production, it lowers food prices and the net effect is 





Model results indicate that South Africa’s agricultural sector currently benefits from global 
price distortions, especially local fruit producers. Most of the remaining agricultural 
subsectors are, however, adversely affected by global distortions. This is especially true for 
traditional exports crops, such as tobacco, sugar and cotton. Global distortions are also biased 
against the livestock and dairy sectors, which are important components of South Africa’s 
food processing sector. Thus, despite a decline in agricultural GDP, removing global 
distortions would favor the creation of new formal sector jobs for lower-skilled agricultural 
and food processing workers, including some who are currently unemployed. There would 
need to be a period of structural adjustment in the country, with manufacturing workers 
migrating to the service sector. In the long-run these workers would benefit from higher-
paying jobs. Removing global price distortions thus improves national economic welfare, 
reduces poverty, and lowers income inequality, albeit only slightly. 
South Africa’s own policies are also biased against agriculture. Tariff protection is 
higher for nonagricultural commodities than for farm products, such that their removal raises 
overall agricultural GDP and employment. There is some contraction of farm industries and 
textiles and clothing. Job losses in these sectors are, however, outweighed by job creation 




when domestic distortions are removed. Household welfare would also improve, especially 
amongst poorer rural households.   
Our findings suggest that own-country policies are more damaging to welfare, poverty 
and inequality in South Africa than distortionary policies in the rest of the world. Further 
rationalization of the country’s system of protection, so that tariffs are more uniformly 
applied across sectors, would reduce some of the existing bias against agriculture and the 
poor. Price distortions may thus explain some of the poor performance of the agricultural 
sector and rural development over the last decade. Removing these distortions entirely would 
increase the benefits from South Africa’s broader reform process. This reform would involve 
less adjustment to the South African economy if domestic reforms are accompanied by 
reform abroad, such as is hoped for under the World Trade Organization’s Doha 
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Imports Exports  Elas-














Total 100.00  100.0  13.3  5.3  100.0  13.2  0.8  3.10 
Agriculture  4.33 1.8 8.1 4.8 4.3  17.3 0.1  2.03 
     Summer cereals  0.54  0.2  5.0  1.0  0.3  7.9  0.0  1.30 
     Winter cereals  0.21  0.4  23.3  14.6  0.0  2.4  0.0  4.45 
     Oilseeds & legumes  0.11  0.1  14.0  4.1  0.0  4.3  0.0  2.45 
     Fodder crops  0.03  0.0  2.4  2.5  0.1  28.2  0.0  3.25 
     Sugarcane  0.26  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.70 
     Cotton & tobacco  0.06  0.4 91.8  3.9  0.3 95.0 0.0  0.50 
     Vegetables  0.27  0.0  0.3  2.8  0.1  7.0  0.0  1.85 
     Fruits   0.97  0.1  6.7  2.8  2.8  58.9  0.0  1.85 
     Livestock  1.58  0.3  2.8  0.5  0.4  4.5  0.0  1.53 
     Fishing  0.01  0.1  95.8  1.7  0.1  97.3  2.0  1.25 
     Forestry  0.29  0.2  15.1  1.7  0.2  10.7  2.0  2.50 
Industry  33.10 86.1 22.1  6.2 80.9 22.5  0.9  3.31 
Mining  8.36 11.0 43.1  0.1 31.4 67.7  1.8  0.96 
Manufacturing  19.97 75.1 23.3  7.2 49.4 18.4  0.4  3.71 
     Meat   0.07  0.2  2.0  5.9  0.1  0.9  0.0  3.85 
     Fish   0.11  0.4  31.5  19.7  0.1  15.7  0.0  4.40 
     Fruit     0.16  0.2  12.6  14.6  1.1  44.8  0.0  3.30 
     Oils    0.08  1.0  39.9  24.2  0.2  12.9  0.0  3.30 
     Dairy   0.22  0.2  5.5  66.9  0.1  5.0  0.0  3.65 
     Grain milling  0.27  0.9  15.3  4.8  0.3  6.1  0.0  2.60 
     Animal feeds  0.08  0.2  7.5  19.9  0.0  1.3  0.0  2.00 
     Bakeries   0.25  0.1  2.6  47.0  0.0  1.3  0.0  2.00 
     Sugar   0.20  0.0  0.8  48.2  0.2  12.9  0.0  2.70 
     Confectionery   0.14  0.0  3.6  18.8  0.1  5.3  0.0  2.00 
     Other  foods   0.31  0.5  16.1  22.0  0.4  13.6  0.0  2.00 
     Bev. & tobacco  1.14  0.8  6.0  6.5  1.6  15.7  0.0  1.15 
     Textiles  0.36  1.8  21.2  22.7  0.4  6.9  2.0  3.74 
     Clothing & footwear  0.57  2.4  17.3  43.8  0.5  6.4  1.9  3.92 
     Wood & paper   1.91  2.4  10.1  7.7  1.3  6.0  1.9  4.05 
     Chemicals   4.75  14.5  18.9  4.9  11.3  16.4  0.3  3.21 
     Non-metals  0.69  1.4  18.3  11.6  0.8  11.4  0.3  2.90 
     Metals   3.41  7.1  17.7  4.1  13.3  28.7  0.4  3.76 
     Machinery   1.59  22.6  52.8  2.9  6.0  27.4  0.3  4.22 
     Transport equipment  1.92  16.7  37.4  9.7  8.7  24.6  0.3  3.88 
     Other manufacturing  1.75  1.8  11.9  5.5  2.9  20.9  0.3  3.75 
Other  industry  4.77 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3  2.28 
Private  services  47.58  12.1 4.3 0.0  14.9 4.9 0.0  1.90 
Public  services  14.99 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  1.90 
a Import intensity is the share of imports in total domestic demand. 
 
b Export intensity is the share of exports in total domestic output. 
 
c Elasticity is the trade elasticity applied to both import demand and export supply functions. 
 




Table 2: Household direct tax rates,
a South Africa, 2000 
 
  Taxes as a share of gross household income (%) 
   Rural areas  Urban areas  Both areas 
Poor households ($US2/day poverty line)  0.0 0.0  0.0
Non-poor households   1.6 4.2  3.2
Rich households (top income decile)  11.3 18.1  17.2
 
 
a Direct taxes only concern formal labor income. 
 




Table 3: Household income shares, South Africa, 2000 
 










Skilled labor  0.3  1.2 9.8 0.2 5.6  35.5
Semi-skilled labor  3.1  9.9 26.6 5.7 26.4  31.4
Unskilled labor  20.5  35.4 38.8 32.8 40.7  11.9
Unspecified labor  3.4  1.9 1.3 3.9 2.4  2.2
Home production  4.4  3.0 0.9 0.4 0.1  0.1
Capital income  4.3  6.9 12.3 5.0 6.7  14.4
Government transfers  34.5  23.2 5.4 33.1 11.1  2.6
Inter-household transfers  29.5  18.5 4.9 19.0 7.0  2.0
Total 100  100 100 100 100  100
 





Table 4: Household expenditure shares, South Africa, 2000 
 
  Share of total household expenditures (%) 
















Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
Agriculture  16.3 12.9 6.7 10.1 6.1 2.4
Food processing  44.4 39.7 26.7 41.1 32.5 15.4
Meat products  8.8 9.6 7.2 10.0 8.9  4.3
Fish products  1.4 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.1  0.7
Fruit & vegetables   0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.1  0.9
Oils & fats products  2.3 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.2  0.4
Dairy products  3.1 2.9 2.0 3.3 2.9  1.7
Grain mill products  9.4 6.2 2.9 6.0 3.3  1.0
Animal feeds  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1  0.2
Bakery products  5.9 5.7 3.3 6.7 4.6  1.3
Sugar products  5.9 3.4 1.4 3.6 1.5  0.4
Confectionary products  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2  0.3
Other processed foods   4.3 3.6 2.5 4.2 3.2  1.6
Beverages & tobacco   2.5 4.1 4.5 3.1 4.1  2.6
Textiles and clothing  7.3 8.1 8.1 6.0 7.5 4.4
Other manufacturing  17.4 18.1 22.2 18.0 17.3 22.4
Other industry  2.7 3.5 4.5 8.9 7.2 5.9
Services 11.9 17.6 31.8 16.0 29.4 49.5  
 





Table 5: Exogenous demand and border price shocks for South Africa from liberalization in 
the rest of the world 
(percent change from baseline) 
  Rest-of-world reform (all commodities) 
Scenario 1 
Rest-of-world reform (agriculture only) 
Scenario 2 
  Import Export Import Export 
 price  Price  Quantity  Price Price  Quantity 
Primary  sector        
     Rice  0.00  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00  0.0 
     Wheat  0.73  0.46  21.6  0.72  0.35  -15.9 
     Other grains  -5.49  0.46  48.6  -5.45  0.35  59.3 
     Oil seeds  -2.28  0.47  -25.5  -2.02  0.34  -13.8 
     Sugarcane  0.00  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00  0.0 
     Cotton  -1.21  0.44  53.2  -0.11  0.33  52.9 
     Vegetables & fruit  -0.90  0.47  -38.6  -0.42  0.34  -33.7 
     Other crops  1.87  0.49  7.0  2.81  0.35  10.9 
     Cattle & sheep  -2.21  0.50  5.7  -0.44  0.33  17.1 
     Other livestock  0.74  0.57  -10.5  1.37  0.34  -1.2 
     Other primary products  0.19  0.55  0.3  0.71  0.41  1.0 
Secondary sector               
     Beef and sheep meat  5.06  0.51  443.5  5.82  0.38  489.9 
     Other meat products  3.71  0.57  -11.4  4.77  0.42  -1.9 
     Oils & fats  -1.80  0.33  -1.1  -2.50  0.14  0.7 
     Dairy products  16.58  0.57  405.9  17.47  0.46  447.6 
     Grain milling  5.03  0.59  -47.2  4.57  0.47  -41.5 
     Sugar refining  1.15  0.49  147.2  2.09  0.39  173.5 
     Other food & beverages   4.97  0.53  58.3  -0.41  0.36  -10.4 
     Textile & clothing  -0.94  0.32  -21.2  0.50  0.43  -0.1 
     Other manufacturing  -0.34  0.45  -2.3  0.20  0.41  -1.2 
     Services  -0.14  0.55  -2.7  0.27  0.43  -0.6 
 
Source: Results from the World Bank’s LINKAGE model (see van der Mensbrugghe, 




Table 6: Macroeconomic simulation results of prospective liberalizations abroad and 
nationally, South Africa
a 
 Base  share 
(% of GDP) 
Change from base (%) 
  Rest-of-world reform  Unilateral reform 
  All  goods Agric.  only All  goods Agric.  only 
Real  GDP  at  market  prices  100.0 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.1 
     Consumption  61.9  1.0  0.6  1.2  0.3 
     Investment  16.1  1.6  1.0  1.6  -0.3 
     Government  18.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Consumer  price  index  - -0.4 -0.1 -1.0 -0.3 
Real  exchange  rate  - -0.8 -0.6  1.9  0.3 
World  export  prices  - 1.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 
World  import  prices  -  -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Terms-of-trade  - 1.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Volume  of  exports  32.6 0.2 0.0 7.5 1.0 
      Agriculture  4.3  -13.2  -11.0  10.7  1.8 
      Mining  31.4 0.3 0.2  -0.4  -0.1 
      Manufacturing  49.4  1.7  1.1  12.3  1.5 
      Other industry  0.1  -0.5  -0.7  5.2  0.2 
      Services  14.9 -1.2 -1.2  5.5  1.0 
  Volume  of  imports  -28.9 2.3 1.6 8.4 1.1 
      Agriculture  1.8  5.0  2.4  6.6  8.9 
      Mining  11.0 -1.4 -1.1  3.3  0.6 
      Manufacturing  75.1  2.7  1.7  11.5  1.3 
      Other industry  0.1  3.7  3.4  -1.3  -0.5 
      Services  12.1 3.4 2.9  -2.9  -0.6 
 
a The domestic price index is the numéraire in the model. 
 




Table 7: Effects of prospective liberalizations abroad and nationally on GDP by sector at 
factor cost, South Africa  
 Base  share 
(% of GDP) 
Change from base (%) 
  Rest-of-world reform  Unilateral reform 
  All  goods Agric.  only All  goods Agric.  only 
Total  100.0 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.1 
Agriculture  4.3 -0.2 -0.1  1.3 -0.9 
       
     Summer cereals  0.5  3.3  3.7  0.1  -0.8 
     Winter cereals  0.2  2.0  -0.6  -12.3  -14.3 
     Oilseeds & legumes  0.1 -1.4 -1.8 -4.9 -6.0 
     Fodder crops  0.0 10.4 12.9 -0.4 -2.8 
     Sugarcane  0.3  8.6  8.6  -0.2  -0.6 
     Cotton & tobacco  0.1 40.5 40.2 25.2  6.1 
     Vegetables  0.3  -1.0 -1.8 -0.8 -1.3 
     Fruits   1.0  -14.5  -15.1  8.1  0.9 
     Livestock  1.6  4.2  5.3  -0.8  -0.6 
     Fishing  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
     Forestry  0.3  -1.0  -0.8  2.3  1.2 
Industry  33.1 0.1  -0.1 0.5 0.1 
Mining  8.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Manufacturing  20.0 0.0  -0.2 0.7 0.2 
     Meat   0.1  6.7  7.9  -0.2  -0.1 
     Fish   0.1  0.9  2.6  -13.9  -16.2 
     Fruit     0.2  -0.8  -0.8  9.2  -0.5 
     Oils    0.1  -2.2  -3.2  -17.8  -21.1 
     Dairy   0.2  35.0 41.1 -7.7 -9.1 
     Grain milling  0.3  0.7  0.4  0.4  -1.0 
     Animal feeds  0.1  5.0  4.7  -2.5  -2.7 
     Bakeries   0.3  1.3  0.3  -0.8  -1.0 
     Sugar refining  0.2  19.7  22.1  0.6  -0.7 
     Confectionery   0.1  3.8  0.7  -0.1  -0.5 
     Other  foods   0.3  8.9 -1.0 -2.2 -3.6 
     Bev. & tobacco  1.1  8.0  -1.6  1.2  0.3 
     Textiles  0.4  -2.8  -0.5  -13.4  0.6 
     Clothing & footwear  0.6  -1.3  0.0  -13.4  0.4 
     Wood & paper   1.9  -0.1  -0.2  0.2  0.4 
     Chemicals   4.8 -1.2 -0.8 -1.4  0.5 
     Non-metals  0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -2.5  0.1 
     Metals   3.4  -2.3  -1.7  3.3  0.9 
     Machinery   1.6  -2.1  -1.5  4.6  0.8 
     Transport equipment  1.9  -2.1  -1.5  7.3  1.1 
     Other manufacturing  1.8  -0.9  -0.7  2.4  0.6 
Other  industry  4.8 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.0 
Private  services  47.6 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.2 
Public  services  15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 




Table 8: Factor intensity structure in South Africa, 2002 
 
  Share of factor income in total value-added (%)  Elas-
ticity









Total  11.9 21.7 16.5 50.0  100.0 1.44 
Agriculture  3.3  1.2 19.4 76.1  100.0 1.50 
     Summer cereals  2.7  1.0  16.3  80.0  100.0  1.50 
     Winter cereals  3.1  1.2  18.7  77.0  100.0  1.50 
     Oilseeds & legumes  2.9  1.0  16.8  79.3  100.0  1.50 
     Fodder crops  3.0  1.1  18.5  77.4  100.0  1.50 
     Sugarcane  3.4  1.3  20.0  75.4  100.0  1.50 
     Cotton & tobacco  4.6  1.7 26.7 67.0 100.0  1.50 
     Vegetables  4.0  1.5  23.7  70.8  100.0  1.50 
     Fruits   3.9  1.5  23.5  71.1  100.0  1.50 
     Livestock  2.9  1.1  17.1  78.9  100.0  1.50 
     Fishing  3.7  1.5  22.4  72.4  100.0  1.50 
     Forestry  3.2  1.2  19.2  76.4  100.0  1.50 
Industry  7.8  9.4 27.6 55.3  100.0 1.31 
Mining  4.1  2.9 31.5 61.5  100.0 0.75 
Manufacturing  9.1 12.4 25.2 53.2  100.0 1.50 
     Meat   1.2  2.5  4.2  92.2  100.0  1.50 
     Fish   7.1  15.1  25.8  51.9  100.0  1.50 
     Fruit     7.9  16.9  28.7  46.5  100.0  1.50 
     Oils    4.8  10.5  17.7  67.0  100.0  1.50 
     Dairy   8.1  17.2  29.3  45.4  100.0  1.50 
     Grain milling  3.9  8.4  14.2  73.5  100.0  1.50 
     Animal feeds  5.4  11.4  19.4  63.8  100.0  1.50 
     Bakeries   10.5  22.5  38.2  28.8  100.0  1.50 
     Sugar   6.5  13.8  23.6  56.1  100.0  1.50 
     Confectionery   10.2  21.8  37.0  31.1  100.0  1.50 
     Other  foods   7.4  15.9  27.0  49.7  100.0  1.50 
     Bev. & tobacco  0.0  12.3  16.0  71.7  100.0  1.50 
     Textiles  1.8  6.0  54.2  38.0  100.0  1.50 
     Clothing & footwear  4.6  4.7  59.4  31.3  100.0  1.50 
     Wood & paper   3.2  3.3  42.1  51.3  100.0  1.50 
     Chemicals   20.4  7.7  12.7  59.2  100.0  1.50 
     Non-metals  1.4  8.2  24.6  65.8  100.0  1.50 
     Metals   2.2  17.0  23.7  57.1  100.0  1.50 
     Machinery   11.3  20.6  32.6  35.5  100.0  1.50 
     Transport equipment  4.2  17.2  36.2  42.4  100.0  1.50 
     Other manufacturing  9.2  6.3  12.3  72.2  100.0  1.50 
Other  industry  8.7  7.8 30.4 53.1  100.0 1.50 
Private  services  10.2 23.1 11.0 55.7  100.0 1.50 
Public  services  28.5 50.5  8.7 12.3  100.0 1.50 
 
a Elasticity is the substitution elasticity between factors. 
 




Table 9: Effects of prospective liberalizations abroad and nationally on factor rewards, 
employment and welfare, South Africa 
 
  Base  Change from base (%) 
  value  Rest-of-world reform  Unilateral reform 
    All  goods Agric.  only All  goods Agric.  only 
    
Average real factor returns 
(R1000/year) 
      
     Skilled labor  127  0.4  0.3  1.2  0.1 
     Semi-skilled labor  78  -0.2  -0.2  0.1  0.0 
     Unskilled  49  -0.5  -0.2  1.6  0.3 
     Capital  -  0.6  0.4  2.3  0.2 
Employment  ( 1 0 0 0 s )        
     Skilled labor  969  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
     Semi-skilled labor  2910  1.2  0.7  2.0  0.2 
     Unskilled  3519  1.0  0.6  1.6  0.0 
     Capital  -  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
National economic welfare 
(equivalent variation in income) 
- 1.0 0.6 1.2 0.2 
 




Table 10: Effects of prospective liberalizations abroad and nationally on sectoral 




Rest-of-world reform  Unilateral reform 
  All  goods Agric.  only All  goods Agric.  only 
    Change from base (%) 
Real factor returns (R/year) 
a        
     Informal sector workers  12,828  2.40  1.31  6.67  0.93 
     Formal sector workers  50,488  -0.20  -0.23  0.83  0.41 
Employment  ( ‘ 0 0 0 s )        
     Subsistence agriculture  736  -0.10  -0.07  -0.16  0.01 
     Informal sector workers  3,357  -0.25  -0.18  -0.15  0.10 
     Formal sector workers  7,307  0.94  0.58  1.54  0.06 
Unemployment  (‘000s)  3,806 -0.66 -0.40 -1.17 -0.07 
Inactive (‘000s) 
b  28,032 -0.12 -0.07 -0.22 -0.02 
Real per capita income (R/year) 
c  10,874 0.91 0.61 1.13 0.42 
       
Poverty headcount ratios (%)    Percentage point change from base (%) 
$1/day  poverty  line  (R87/m)  9.8 -0.28 -0.27 -0.78 -0.21 
          Rural   16.7  -0.35  -0.34  -1.09  -0.33 
          Urban  4.0  -0.22  -0.21  -0.51  -0.10 
$2/day  poverty  line  (R177/m)  29.2 -0.34 -0.26 -1.12 -0.26 
          Rural   46.4  -0.28  -0.24  -1.32  -0.32 
          Urban  14.8  -0.39  -0.29  -0.96  -0.21 
Lower  poverty  line  (R322/m)  50.1 -0.39 -0.23 -1.05 -0.25 
          Rural   71.5  -0.18  -0.12  -0.72  -0.22 
          Urban  32.2  -0.56  -0.32  -1.33  -0.28 
Upper  poverty  line  (R593/m)  67.5 -0.25 -0.16 -0.67 -0.23 
          Rural   86.3  -0.09  -0.08  -0.46  -0.15 
          Urban  51.8  -0.39  -0.23  -0.86  -0.30 
       
Gini coefficient  0.67 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
          Rural   0.63  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
          Urban  0.62  -0.001  -0.001  -0.006  -0.001 
 
a Average real per capita earnings 
 
b Includes 652,000 "unspecified" workers 
 
c Average real disposable income per capita 
 
Source: Authors’ simulation results using their South African microsimulation model. 




Appendix Table A1: Changes in the real value of exports, South Africa 
 Base  share 
(%) 
Change from base (%) 
  Rest-of-world reform  Unilateral reform 
  All  goods Agric.  only All  goods Agric.  only 
Total  100.00 0.23 0.01 7.47 0.95 
Agriculture  4.26 -13.15 -10.95  10.74  1.79 
       
     Summer cereals  0.27  24.82  30.03  1.86  -0.50 
     Winter cereals  0.03  10.00  -10.36  -5.45  -12.12 
     Oilseeds & legumes  0.03  -14.62  -8.95  -1.69  -5.36 
     Fodder crops  0.06  6.80  10.13  4.40  -1.96 
     Sugarcane  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
     Cotton & tobacco  0.31 41.74 41.45 26.21  6.38 
     Vegetables  0.11  -21.34  -19.11  1.81  -0.81 
     Fruits   2.80  -25.15  -23.10  11.99  1.58 
     Livestock  0.42  -5.81  -0.46  2.53  1.65 
     Fishing  0.06  -0.01  -0.05  0.33  0.38 
     Forestry  0.16  -1.66  -1.04  12.88  8.73 
Industry  80.88 1.15 0.77 7.65 0.89 
Mining  31.43 0.29 0.23  -0.35  -0.11 
Manufacturing  49.39 1.66 1.09  12.34 1.48 
     Meat   0.07  433.36  503.60  10.05  3.23 
     Fish   0.11  -7.93  -2.23  -5.09  -12.77 
     Fruit     1.13  -2.60  -1.91  20.75  3.10 
     Oils    0.23  -2.84  -2.47  -5.09  -13.44 
     Dairy   0.14  446.27  522.81  2.92  -5.95 
     Grain milling  0.26  -24.94  -22.00  6.47  1.46 
     Animal feeds  0.03  32.79  -3.78  4.05  1.30 
     Bakeries   0.03  32.43  -6.56  4.35  0.90 
     Sugar refining  0.24  109.71  132.83  6.03  0.40 
     Confectionery   0.06  32.13  -5.65  4.64  1.26 
     Other  foods   0.38  34.84  -6.78  4.35  0.24 
     Bev. & tobacco  1.55  33.55  -7.62  4.40  1.22 
     Textiles  0.42  -13.93  -1.73  8.22  2.30 
     Clothing & footwear  0.46  -15.23  -1.62  15.44  3.26 
     Wood & paper   1.31  -2.69  -2.17  12.28  1.89 
     Chemicals   11.30  -2.84  -2.19  5.17  1.41 
     Non-metals  0.78  -2.30  -1.80  2.21  0.72 
     Metals   13.26  -3.23  -2.63  7.91  1.45 
     Machinery   5.99  -2.33  -1.90  14.34  1.29 
     Transport equipment  8.72  -2.72  -2.25  27.85  1.82 
     Other manufacturing  2.92  -3.65  -2.94  18.89  2.57 
Other  industry  0.06 -0.52 -0.73  5.23  0.23 
Private  services  14.86 -1.15 -1.15  5.45  1.02 
Public  services  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 





Appendix Table A2: Changes in the real value of imports, South Africa 
 Base  share 
(%) 
Change from base (%) 
  Rest-of-world reform  Unilateral reform 
  All  goods Agric.  only All  goods Agric.  only 
Total  100.00 2.34 1.56 8.43 1.07 
Agriculture  1.81 4.98 2.40 6.61 8.85 
       
     Summer cereals  0.16  8.28  7.39  -0.42  0.09 
     Winter cereals  0.39  4.78  2.44  43.58  47.01 
     Oilseeds & legumes  0.11  8.72  6.81  1.21  2.47 
     Fodder crops  0.00  12.07  10.20  -0.50  3.45 
     Sugarcane  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
     Cotton & tobacco  0.44 4.67 0.48 -2.51  0.88 
     Vegetables  0.00  6.22  3.84  1.34  3.04 
     Fruits   0.14  5.14  -0.69  1.29  3.08 
     Livestock  0.26  4.98  2.85  -2.72  -0.46 
     Fishing  0.06  1.89  5.43  -28.90  -33.66 
     Forestry  0.24  2.45  0.83  -0.11  1.91 
Industry  86.13 2.12 1.32  10.31 1.17 
Mining  10.96 -1.42 -1.10  3.28  0.58 
Manufacturing  75.08 2.71 1.73  11.51 1.27 
     Meat   0.21  -11.97  -14.67  11.80  16.17 
     Fish   0.43  -4.42  -7.50  46.04  49.50 
     Fruit     0.24  6.79  3.48  25.36  33.85 
     Oils    1.04  7.15  7.54  35.66  38.55 
     Dairy   0.23  -38.17  -40.97  221.24  229.82 
     Grain milling  0.85  -5.48  -5.69  6.01  7.50 
     Animal feeds  0.17  -3.03  7.15  28.46  30.76 
     Bakeries   0.08  -5.18  3.03  76.35  79.40 
     Sugar refining  0.02  -4.28  -10.12  110.26  113.74 
     Confectionery   0.04  -6.29  3.72  30.62  33.53 
     Other  foods   0.49  -5.39  3.90  30.04  31.77 
     Bev. & tobacco  0.75  -3.16  2.33  4.19  5.27 
     Textiles  1.84  4.83  1.48  41.04  -0.71 
     Clothing & footwear  2.37  5.89  1.81  98.01  -0.78 
     Wood & paper   2.38  4.26  2.51  13.39  -0.73 
     Chemicals   14.48  3.01  1.97  7.34  -0.64 
     Non-metals  1.35  3.87  2.57  21.18  -0.48 
     Metals   7.06  2.71  1.72  8.34  -0.14 
     Machinery   22.57  2.72  1.77  2.84  -0.37 
     Transport equipment  16.73  2.55  1.64  13.64  -0.29 
     Other manufacturing  1.77  5.85  3.74  7.03  -0.87 
Other  industry  0.09 3.74 3.36  -1.33  -0.49 
Private  services  12.06 3.38 2.94  -2.88  -0.61 
Public  services  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Source: Authors’ simulation results using their South African CGE model. 